Writing in the Telegraph, former Defence Secretary Ben Wallace declared President Trump and Vice President J.D. Vance “clueless” on Ukraine. A verdict echoed, in more measured tones, across British and European commentary – especially after Zelensky’s Oval Office showdown with Trump over how (or whether) to end the war. Much Western media took Ukraine’s side, casting Zelensky yet again as the plucky Churchillian underdog battling Putin’s dictatorship – now allegedly aided by White House appeasers. If only it were all that simple.
Trump and Vance have never made a secret of their intention to extricate the US from the Ukrainian morass. Whatever the rights and wrongs of their approach, should they take strategic advice from those like Ben Wallace? The same Ben Wallace who, in the Telegraph in October 2023, triumphantly proclaimed:
Whisper it if you need. Dare to think it. But champion it you must. Ukraine’s counteroffensive is succeeding. Slowly but surely, the Ukrainian armed forces are breaking through the Russian lines. Sometimes yard by yard, sometimes village by village, Ukraine has the momentum and is pressing forward.
Reality, of course, had other plans. Ukraine’s much-hyped counteroffensive – on which so many Western hopes rested – failed, particularly in the Zaporizhzhia region, where efforts to reclaim lost coastline barely dented Russia’s first defensive line. The foray into Kursk also proved ineffective in altering the military balance on the ground. Now, with 20% of its territory lost and outmatched in manpower and resources, Ukraine is stuck in a war that isn’t going anywhere.
Yet European leaders keep talking tough – floating ideas like putting troops on the ground or enforcing a no-fly zone. But with West European militaries too feeble to operate without the US, such gestures are optimistic at best, delusional at worst. And in the absence of a ceasefire, those troops would make fine targets for the Russians – escalating a war that already lacks any obvious end goal.
Groundhog Day Warfare – the Habit of Repeating Failure
Setting aside the conflict’s origins, battlefield realities and the merits of Trump and Vance’s diplomacy (all topics worth scrutiny), the loudest voices in media and politics seem allergic to a basic question: Why does this keep happening? Western backing of Ukraine appears poised to join the long list of strategic debacles – Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Yemen – each a masterclass in self-inflicted disaster. This is the elephant in the room expertly ignored by those who claim to be elephant watchers.
These interventions have toppled imperfect but functional governments, destabilised entire regions, bled Western coffers dry, managed the rare feat of weakening both soft power and deterrence, and unleashed blowback – most notably, waves of uncontrolled migration that have rattled Western societies. And yet, no one stops to ask the obvious: Why do we keep stepping on the same rake? Repeating failure while expecting success isn’t just folly. Calling it insanity might actually be too kind.
What follows is an attempt to dissect this pattern of failure – to trace the roots of Western strategic cluelessness and explain why it keeps coming back. Why, in other words, does good strategy seem to be so difficult for Western policymakers?
First, let’s be clear about the terms. ‘Good strategy’ means achieving meaningful goals, maximising interests and getting things done as efficiently as possible. It’s about weighing costs and benefits, balancing risk and reward, understanding both your strengths and your adversary’s, and – crucially – knowing when to quit while you’re ahead.
At its core, good strategy follows the principle of proportionality. Simply put, that is the art of knowing what is worth fighting for, what it will likely cost, and if necessary, when to cut your losses. It is the ability to tweak, pivot or abandon a course of action when reality fails to cooperate. It’s about being prudent.
Prudence isn’t about timidity – it’s about smart risk-taking. Prudence doesn’t mean paralysis; it means asking the right questions before charging in. Why are we doing this? What’s the endgame? And, most importantly, is this really worth the trouble?
Bad strategy, on the other hand, is the craft of barrelling ahead with a plan that was either doomed from the start, poorly conceived or stubbornly clung to even as its goals slip further out of reach.
The Extinction of Common Sense – Why Good Judgement is Rarer than a Unicorn
Prudence in decision-making – questioning what one aims to achieve at a proportional cost – is no guarantee of success, but it is a hallmark of sound judgement. This elusive quality fuses reasoning, contextual awareness and an instinct for pragmatic adaptation to shifting circumstances. Capturing it remains an inexact art, but it is the defining trait of those who master strategy and statecraft rather than merely dabble in it. It is the practice of Metternich and Castlereagh in orchestrating stability in post-Napoleonic Europe, Bismarck and his deft power politics to unite Germany, and of Field Marshal Alan Brooke, navigating existential peril with a clear sighted understanding of how Allied strategy in Europe should map out to defeat the Nazis in the West.
Of course, the practice of good judgement – good strategy – is always easier said than done. Choices often unfold amidst uncertainty, often with a determined adversary actively seeking to thwart one’s interests. A host of factors conspire against clear-eyed decision-making: time constraints, resource scarcity, gaps in knowledge, and the ever-present pressure to act. These are the very elements that Carl von Clausewitz, the Prussian soldier-scholar, termed “fog and friction” – the mundane yet formidable forces that turn even the simplest strategic tasks into arduous ordeals.
Why, though, is good judgement – defined here as the willingness to weigh costs and consequences with due care – so conspicuously absent in contemporary Western politics?
The Paradox of Expertise – More Think Tanks, Worse Thinking
The systemic dysfunctions of foreign and military policy present a striking paradox. Nowhere is the cultivation of strategic thought more explicit than in the West – particularly in the Anglophone world, where institutes, think tanks, armed forces academies, university courses, books and journals devote considerable energy to refining strategic reasoning. The focus is clear: defining national security priorities, drawing lessons from history and identifying the conditions for effective policy making. In short, the very precepts of sound strategy. And yet, from within this self-proclaimed ecosystem of expertise, we have witnessed a remarkable proliferation of strategic missteps.
Richard Rumelt, a specialist in corporate strategy, offers a useful taxonomy of strategic malpractice. Good strategy, he argues, is about concentrating resources to tackle the “crux” of a problem. Bad strategy, by contrast, is a miasma of high-minded aspirations devoid of actionable objectives. While his framework is invaluable for businesses and bureaucracies, it is less directly applicable to national strategy, where the symptoms of dysfunction tend to be more subtle. After all, the chronic failures of contemporary Western strategy are not due to a lack of action. If anything, the problem is an excess of it – disproportionate, miscalculated and often disastrously expensive.
The Proportionality Problem – Bringing a Sledgehammer to a Knife Fight
So why do Western nations struggle with proportionate action? Historically, prudence played a more central role in strategic decision-making. Consider Britain’s empire: a small maritime nation that managed, for nearly 150 years, to rule a third of the world’s land surface with fewer administrators than a modern city council. That requires more than just audacity. It demands a rigorous balancing of resources against objectives. Even when decolonisation became inevitable, Britain’s exit strategy for the most part prioritised minimising costs and maintaining favourable post-imperial relations.
None of this is to suggest that policymakers of the past were infallible or that post-Cold War strategy has been uniformly hopeless. The 1990-91 Gulf War remains a textbook example of limited war for defined ends. Western interventions in the Balkans – though endlessly debatable – ultimately nudged some of those conflicts towards resolution. And Britain’s 2000 intervention in Sierra Leone, unlike so many others, is generally considered a success. The lesson here is not that the past was a golden age of strategy but that, once upon a time, Western powers understood the virtues of restraint and proportionality. These days, they often seem to have forgotten both.
It is difficult to deny that Anglo-American strategic planning – both in concept and execution – has gone spectacularly off the rails since 2001. The core problem is a chronic inability to approach problems proportionately. Instead, there’s a tendency to either wade into interminable wars or engage in half-baked regime-change escapades, or in the case of Ukraine, sponsor an ill-thought-out proxy war against a major geopolitical power, as if strategy were a series of impulsive dares rather than a discipline requiring foresight.
When Winning is an Afterthought: the Rise of Anti-Strategy
For those inclined to think this an exaggeration, let us consider the seminal architects of these recent follies.
Take, for instance, the ‘Letter to President Clinton on Iraq’ dated January 26th 1998, penned by the eminences of the Project for a New American Century. Among its signatories were Francis Fukuyama, William Kristol and Robert Kagan, along with a veritable who’s who of the US foreign policy establishment. Armed with Ivy League degrees, ensconced in prominent Washington think tanks or comfortably tenured at prestigious universities, they urged Clinton to “enunciate a new strategy” to “secure the interests of the US and our friends and allies around the world”.
And what was this grand strategy? It was the “removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime from power”. They assured the President that “diplomacy is clearly failing” and that military action was the only acceptable course. Lest anyone think them naïve, they solemnly acknowledged “the dangers and difficulties” – before proceeding to dismiss them in favour of decisive action, which, they assured, would serve “the most fundamental national security interests of the country”.
If that weren’t enough, the explicit contempt for prudence and proportionality was laid out with even greater brazenness in a January 2002 paper for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Its authors, Robert Kagan and William Kristol, ridiculed those who had the temerity to advocate “limiting American involvement overseas, for avoiding the use of ground troops, for using force in a limited way and only as a last resort, for steering clear of nation-building, for exit strategies and burden-sharing – those who prided themselves on their prudence and realism”. “If we fail to address the grave threat we know exists”, they thundered, “what will we tell the families of future victims? That they were ‘prudent’?”
The strategic illiteracy of these quotations is self-evident. They exemplify how a fundamentally anti-strategic mindset permeates influential segments of the Western foreign policy establishment. Various explanations could account for this persistent failure, but as a provocation, one hypothesis is worth considering: the flawed strategic thinking of the past two decades can be traced to the enduring influence of a total war mentality.
Total War Brainrot – How World War II Still Haunts Western Thinking
Total war – the idea that an entire society must be mobilised for an existential struggle – looms large in the Western imagination as the formula for victory in both world wars. The winner, as the story goes, is the side that can best harness its national energies, endure the hardships and grind the enemy down to exhaustion. This mentality slid seamlessly into the Cold War, which was framed as yet another titanic ideological contest, culminating in the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1990-91. But while the Cold War ended, the reflexive impulse to apply totalising solutions to every problem did not. This is the root of much Western strategic folly.
The logic of total war fosters a Manichean worldview in which prudence gives way to grandiose, all-encompassing objectives, cast in stark moral terms: good versus evil, light versus dark, us versus them. This moral absolutism carried over into the post-Cold War era, shaping the US administration’s ‘war on terror’ and ‘Axis of Evil’ rhetoric after 9/11, which provided a sweeping justification for military interventions. But the persistence of total war thinking extends beyond actual wars. It can be seen in the way Western political discourse has been drenched in warlike language ever since 1945. We’ve fought the ‘war on drugs’, the ‘war on poverty’, the ‘war on cancer’ and even the ‘war on alcoholism’ – an especially tenacious and well-entrenched enemy.
This tendency reared its head in the ‘war on Covid’. The British Medical Journal observed that the pandemic response was awash with bio-military metaphors: where physicians became “warriors on the front lines” and entire nations were conscripted into the “fight” against the virus. Governments, adopting the total war playbook, assumed extraordinary powers to “defeat” Covid – shutting schools and businesses, restricting human contact, enforcing social distancing, mandating masks and vaccines, and treating even mild scepticism about these measures as a near-treasonable offence.
That total war thinking that influenced the Covid era wasn’t a vague undercurrent; it was explicitly proclaimed. In late 2020, one US analyst sombrely assured us that “Clausewitz would almost certainly endorse a national COVID-19 strategy and war effort in which the Government executes its powers to compel the entire nation-state into a uniform response”. This, of course, bears an unsettling resemblance to Erich Ludendorff’s 1935 treatise Der Totale Krieg – a work so militantly statist that even Clausewitz, had he been available for comment, might have asked to be left out of it.
Leaving aside the question of whether Clausewitz’s opinion on epidemiology can be reliably summoned from beyond the grave, or whether applying militarised rhetoric to non-violent medical and social challenges makes any conceptual sense, the key problem with the total war mentality is that it treats proportionality and prudence as expendable. It demands that every problem, no matter how specific or containable, be met with an overwhelming response.
The Totalitarian Instinct – Why We Keep Trying to Control the Uncontrollable
A totalising mind is one often consumed by ideology and is therefore rarely flexible. Sure, it can pinpoint a single objective with precision, but that precision often comes at the cost of adaptability – or any ability to admit it might be wrong.
The price for acknowledging its blunders? Usually astronomical. It’s a mindset that requires over 50,000 combat deaths and $141 billion to realise that trying to prevent the collapse of a corrupt South Vietnam to the communists wasn’t worth the effort. It’s the same conviction that had to endure years of insurgency and a catastrophic sectarian civil war before it grudgingly acknowledged that invading Iraq – especially after the non-discovery of weapons of mass destruction and the underwhelming enthusiasm of the populace to be ‘liberated’ – was a colossally bad idea. It’s a mindset that only learns the folly of nation-building in Afghanistan after a two-decade, multi-trillion-dollar charade.
And let’s not forget the mind that still believes the expenditure of trillions of dollars, countless social harms and lives lost in the name of halting a virus was worthwhile, even when studies suggest all that effort may have reduced mortality by a pitiful 0.2%. Meanwhile, the strategic clairvoyants who invoked Clausewitz to justify a single-minded, nationally directed COVID-19 response – because apparently that’s how you “concentrate force” and “promote shared objectives” – might want to note that researchers from Johns Hopkins University found lockdowns to be “ill-founded” and “should be rejected out of hand”.
What’s the common thread? These poor strategic choices aren’t the result of a few bad decisions; they’re a chronic pattern of repeat offences. So why does this keep recurring? What drives this enduring strategic relapse? The answer might just lie in the obsessive grip of total war thinking. But is that enough to explain it all?
People as Pawns – the Fantasy of a Conquerable Public
Totalising responses can be justified in moments of supreme emergency – when national survival truly hangs in the balance. In such circumstances, as with Britain in World War II, the public is likely to see – or be convinced of – the necessity of large-scale sacrifices. They may also accept the logic of unrestricted objectives, such as unconditional surrender, which required not just the defeat but the invasion, occupation, and – in Germany’s case – dismemberment of the enemy as the price of victory.
In other words, people recognise extreme responses as proportionate when the threat itself is existential. The real problem, however, is the post-war habit of applying the total war blueprint to threats that by any reasonable measure do not imperil the physical survival of nations. This tendency represents one of the more pernicious quirks of modern Western strategic thought – or what passes for it. So how did we arrive at this state of affairs?
One clue lies in the nature of 20th Century world wars, which were, at their core, wars of the people – conflicts requiring the full mobilisation of society against an enemy. Such wars demanded mass participation and, crucially, mass consent. A shared fate, a common enemy and the imperative to defend a particular national way of life were prerequisites for sustaining total war as a viable concept. Without public buy-in, total war simply could not function.
The question, then, is what happens when the grand, existential struggles fade away? In 1998, following the Cold War’s conclusion – the last of the great totalising conflicts – the philosopher Anthony Giddens declared that the West was now “without enemies” and that large-scale inter-state war was increasingly unlikely.
One might assume this would herald an era of international relaxation, in which states could afford to mind their own business. Not so. Thinkers like Giddens instead envisioned a new grand project, one in which the West would embark on an ambitious mission to “connect issues of national and global governance”. In place of superpower struggle, a “liberal imperialist posture” emerged – dedicated to enforcing a democratic “rules-based order” across the world, whether the world wanted it or not.
Unlimited Goals, Limited Competence – How to Demand Everything and Achieve Nothing
After the Cold War, this totalising outlook evolved into a relentless pursuit of a ‘New World Order’, an idealistic vision to spread liberal values globally. This was especially appealing to Western elites at the so-called “end of history” when everything supposedly aligned in a utopian narrative. A single, overarching strategic framework replaced more sceptical, pragmatic assessments of national interests, favouring military interventions shrouded in the lofty promise of cosmopolitan virtue.
The problem with such totalising ideologies is that they cannot maintain coherence without total support from the population. The sacrifices required to uphold this liberal international order – whether it’s ousting ‘rogue’ regimes in the Middle East or supporting Ukraine against Russia – are hard to sell to a public that isn’t facing an existential threat. Why should people support endless interventions, especially when the objectives are vague and the rewards uncertain?
Framing problems in simple moral binaries – democracy vs autocracy, freedom vs tyranny – along with the recurring invocation of World War II imagery (always confronting the ‘new Hitler’, be it Slobodan Milosevic, Saddam Hussein or Vladimir Putin) resonates with many in the West, particularly governments and media. Such rhetoric may sound stirring in speeches, but it loses its appeal as the costs rise and the goals remain vague. Eventually, people question whether the response is proportional, and the national consensus begins to fracture, leaving scholars of realpolitik and much of the public alike wondering what happened to the art of achieving clear, measurable objectives.
Welcome to the Ineptocracy
An uncompromising liberal idealism, rooted in an age of non-total threats, offers one compelling explanation for the strategic blunders of recent years. When people don’t feel their survival is at stake, they become reluctant to bankroll the ambitious schemes of those still fixated on a neo-total war doctrine. The real question, then, is why policymaking has drifted so far from popular consent – and why policymakers cling, with near-religious fervour, to an outdated way of thinking: replacing an understanding of public sentiment with the policy obsessions of an increasingly cloistered ‘expertocracy’.
There are many layers to this mystery, not least the social forces nudging Western societies toward a post-democratic era, where new elites view the public as an inconvenient problem to be managed. One glaring consequence is the sequestration of strategic decision-making within a closed circle of technocrats – a priesthood that often dismisses popular sentiment as crude, uninformed and hopelessly out of sync with cosmopolitan orthodoxy. These self-anointed experts, credentialed in the sacred art of grand strategic theorising, have crowned themselves the arbiters of what constitutes sound policy.
And here we return to the paradox. Judging by the past three decades, the effectiveness of strategy appears to be inversely proportional to the number of universities and think tanks devoted to studying it. The more intellectual horsepower thrown at strategy, the more spectacular the failures.
Which leaves us with an uncomfortable question: are we part of the problem? Have we, the self-styled curators of strategic wisdom, unwittingly cultivated the belief that strategy is some esoteric knowledge, accessible only to a select few – while the unwashed masses, predictably, should be kept at a safe distance?
Are we, the supposed custodians of good strategy, in fact, just another part of the machinery that keeps producing bad strategy?
Michael Rainsborough was Professor of Strategic Theory at King’s College London and between 2016 and 2019 was Head of the Department of War Studies. He is now a Professor of Strategic Theory in Australia. His latest book is A Front Row at the End of History: The Untimely Essays of David Martin Jones and M.L.R. Smith, 1999-2024.
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Being an expert these days appears to be determined by the time spent studying and/or applying oneself to something, regardless of outcomes.
Nothing could be more stupid.
Professor Ferguson of Imperial College London being a prime example
Exactly. You might “know a lot” about something, or appear to, but if your “knowledge” leaves you unable to reliably predict outcomes or unable to produce useful outcomes then “knowledge” isn’t very useful.
Whatever you think you might know, there is more you don’t know and whatever little you might now know, is out of date, fallible, or liable to be displaced more quickly than you believe.
None of these ‘experts’ or ‘scientists’ understand that simple fact and few if any have any humility, wisdom, morality or a real understanding of anything. Except money, power and privilege.
Couldn’t agree more with these comments. Just because one knows a lot about a niche subject or area, doesn’t confer any wider wisdom about how to act in the world. On the contrary, being cloistered in a self-regarding ‘expertocratic’ ecosystem often succeeds only in detaching oneself from the reality of how most people think, which ultimately causes the ‘expert’ – ironically – to misunderstand their own societies. Thank for the comments – MR
Fergusson is a physicist among other things. Being non medical he”didnt have a feel for the figures”
PS he also had an abysmal record on forecasting
The UK Government strategy of dealing with a pandemic had been in place for years. But a week of ‘political events’ up-ended it.
So with a week being a long time in politics and a strategy possibly needing a decade or more to unfold, the quick and dirty political reflex will win every time. And ‘magically’ no politician will suffer for their stupidity.
Not true. The government had a strategy for dealing with an influenza epidemic which it believed could result in up to 750,000 deaths. Governments had been advised by the WHO in 2005 before it became a Chinese puppet to develop strategies for influenza AND for a MERS/SARS pandemic. Successive governments played down the MERS/SARS pandemic with each iteration of its response plan such that the final pre-covid version did not even mention it by name but referred to an unspecified disease that might kill less than 100.
Yes, very true, in my view. One of the handmaidens of terrible strategy is no accountability for failure, and we’ve seen that each and every time over recent decades. In fact, on the contrary, the more politicians, bureaucrats and academics fail in their predictions and their strategies, the more they seem to get elevated in public life. So long one is on the ‘correct’ side of the ideological debate its seems no amount of failure or ineptitude will hold you back. Hence the term ‘ineptocracy’ to describe the current regime.
“Armed with Ivy League degrees…”
…Therein lies the problem.
And under no circumstance to commit their precious Ivy League offspring to the sharp end of the War on Terror. Sacrifice as I say, not as I do. The old lie lives on – Dulce et decorum est.
A good point to add to the understanding of what constitutes bad strategy: those who advocate the need to sacrifice blood and treasure almost never bear the cost of their advocacy. The ‘Ivy League’ brigade can be the worst exemplars of this.
One can contrast this with the policymakers of yesteryear who often had much experience of serving in the armed forces and fighting in wars. Who’s to say whether it always made them better decision makers, but it did give them a seriousness and gravitas that you can’t really say characterises politics in the modern era. MR
Excellent article.
Wars create “money” and “power”.
Politicians crave power.
Capitalists crave money.
There is also a revolving door between the two.
It is easy to manipulate the population into believing anything.
There are so called sceptics on here who don’t even know they are being manipulated.
Liberalism and the mantra that “something must be done” leads to manufactured conflicts that benefit the few.
The elite have been using Problem, Reaction, Solution for eons.
Agreed great article. Military planners always want an exit strategy. Unfortunately they rarely get one, and thenhave to grin and bear it. There wasn’t a decent one in former Yougoslavia, nor Gulf War 2, nor Afghanistan, nor Libya. Yet politicians still press on and then wonder why things don’t work out. (Of course many get slung out of office and leave the mess to the next person).
Starmer must be totally insane to talk about ‘boots on the ground’ in Ukraine. There are so many problems (political, practical, economic) with this idea that it’s almost impossible to know where to start. The key problem is we have Minsters who would struggle in a Parish Council.
Thank you for the kind words, GlassHalfFull and Solentviews.
The point about the Problem/Reaction/Solution paradigm is well taken. The notion of strategy as ‘problem-solving’, while of course understandable up to a point, can also lead to bad strategic outcomes as you imply, often just seeing the immediate surface issue to be dealt with(eg. Russian aggression), while not thinking through the longer term questions, such as ‘what are we trying to achieve’, ‘what is the plan’ and ‘what is the exit strategy’, as Solentviews perceptively notes – MR
Too much generalisation here.
Some Politicians crave power, but it’s been the Collectivists, or Ex-Collectivists that have been calling the shots, quite literally, Political Idealists, using the patriotic Military, for their own ends.
And Capitalists craving money?
Just because you crave money, doesn’t make you a Capitalist. Just look at the Nationalised Industries, and how they sucked up cash! Look at those Ultra-Liberal Left receivers of USAID money. When you ‘run out of other people money’, war can be used to generate financial activity.
And the underlying problem is the spell, “It’s your duty to vote at every general election’. While it may be true, that is all that happens. It results in having two candidates from the Uni-party, one in a red tie, the other blue.
That’s the problem. And those that are truly Wealth Creating become Engineers (Medical doctors are a sort of Engineer), Manufacturers, Businessmen and Businesswomen, have a Trade or Craft. And the Money Printers appear to find Politics just fine!
Good stuff.
The problem is in the machinery itself. The modern state is huge and designed to control every aspect of human activity. Not just that. It is designed to expand and take over more and more areas of human activity. That is the nature of the machinery.
So it isn’t an issue of the people running the machine, their moral compass, their ability or lack thereof, their wisdom, the legitimacy of their objectives. Mo matter what people are plugged into the machine, the machine is going to produce what the machine is designed to produce: to control and seek out new things to control.
If we want different outcomes, then the machine (the state) needs to be scaled back massively.
The little hope that I have for Trump and his presidency is only based on whatever he is able to do to pare back the state. And as a natural disruptor he has as good a chance as anyone I’ve seen in my lifetime.
Apart from Milei n Argentina I don’t see anyone else with that clear idea in mind.
In the UK and Europe we have no chance yet. The population has not suffered enough and does not have enough of a freedom instinct to demand actual change. I’m afraid we are going to get a lot more of the same for some time to come.
I think it’s partly evolution rather then design – these things tend to take on a life of their own because the people involved in them want to keep and expand their status. I think the design bit has been malign intentions to expand the machinery for ideological reasons. I also think that it does make some difference who is running the machine, but agree that it’s not the root of the problem. In some ways I would say the problem is not the nature of the machinery but the fact that people accept it or approve of it or don’t see it – as you say, we’ve not suffered enough (though I feel I bloody have!).
I’ve seen many well intentioned people go into situations that inevitably transform them. The systems of incentives are such that they drive people to the same outcomes regardless of their initial intentions.
The system of incentives produced by the state and its institutions don’t allow any other outcome.
Yes I imagine it’s very hard to resist the direction of travel.
Masks being imposed in the office comes to mind. Not sure how far someone would get just saying “I disagree with the science” but asking for some sort of cost benefit analysis could’ve worked if only enough people demanded it perhaps?
If enough people dig their heels in then things get interesting. But they tend not to.
We were asked to do “mandatory sexual harassment training” at work by HR, who had I think advised the boss that this was a “reasonable step” we needed to take to cover ourselves in case we got sued by an employee, in light of recent changes to employment law in this area (thanks to “socialism”). I refused. I got away with it because I am very important to the firm. As far as I know, everyone else just did it.
That sort of thing is so insidious.
These things are always framed in such a way as to make it very awkward to refuse.
Who doesn’t want to learn how to be less racist or less bigoted or less discriminatory? Only bad person who refuses to become a better person.
It seems to occur to very few the implicit accusation in being “invited” to these courses, that you are a bit racist or in the case of your course too gauche to realise you might be acting inappropriately when engaging with others.
The people who push this stuff are evil grifters
I appreciate all these comments…thank you. The general points made about the all encompassing nature of the state machinery, and the way it manipulates and coerces people into controlled behaviours, can be seen as one of the insidious outgrowths of the total war mindset, which holds that entire populations, in both times of war and peace, should be thoroughly conditioned and prepared for future conflict.
Erich Ludendorff’s exposition, Der Total Krieg, was one of the earliest tracts that extolled this line of thinking though we can see the long term working out of the impact of the ‘total state’ thinking arising out of both world wars, in massively expanded state bureaucratic institutions that seek to regulate so much of our lives. Analysts have often called this the growth of the administrative state, or the national security state, but it is very much an extension of total war thinking.
Erich Ludendorff’s exposition, Der Total Krieg, was one of the earliest tracts that extolled this line of thinking though we can see the long term working out of the impact of the ‘total state’ thinking arising out of both world wars, in massively expanded state bureaucratic institutions that seek to regulate so much of our lives.
Ludendorff was seriously late to the party in this respect as he had been military commander and not civil politician/ administrator during the first world war, when this concept had to be improvised into practice almost overnight because the British sea blockade had cut off Germany from the rest of the world.¹ Try Helfferich’s Der Weltkrieg I – III for a much earlier version (1919). And this wasn’t a theoretical discourse by militant statists (sillyterm not having been invented by then) but an experiment these people had to make – to a large degree against their very convictions which were more in favour of free enterprise and free trade – because of dire necessity.
¹ And improvised it was and it enabled to Germans to continue fighting until they had burnt through most of their manpower reserves in late summer 1918. Afterwards, the same soldiers fought a civil war for control of Germany against communist revolutionaries who had violently disposed of the existing state governments, all while the command economy had to be maintained because Germany remained cut off from international trade until the Versailles treaty got signed in 1919.
Indeed, though in our case the intention was merely “compliance” with a perceived requirement of recent legislation, to cover ourselves, so refusing in my case could more be criticised as potentially undermining us financially, in the same way as my objections to our CSR and DEI policies could have jeopardised a big contract we are bidding for. I did manage to get the “DEI” words removed from our “DEI” draft policy – actually there was no pushback on that, so it now amounts to “we will comply with all relevant legislation” – idiotic really. The assumption used to be that a firm would, er, comply with the law and an employee would know not to sexually harass people, without having to say so or demonstrate it in advance.
I took advice from the FSU about the sexual harassment “training” – they advise you pretty much have no choice but to do it or face disciplinary action – I expect they are right. They advise to note problematic aspects of the training in case of problems. I found the whole idea of it repulsive so I didn’t do it, though apparently the boss said it was full of woke BS. Hopefully we won’t rush into something like that again. I am no expert on employment law but I actually don’t think it’s necessary to force people to do training, just to deal with actual incidents in a sensible manner should they occur, but I reckon HR advisory firms like the one we use probably tell people to tick all the boxes they can think of because it’s safer – probably the advisors worry they will get sued by us if something goes wrong. A climate of fear all round – quite intentional.
The Medical profession used to held in high esteem: not so much now, of course. They don’t deserve it.
Truss tried, and was spat out.
Indeed. I suspect in hindsight knowing what she does now she would approach things differently, though that may not have been sufficient. She was ultimately betrayed by her fellow Tory MPs.
“Why does this keep happening? Western backing of Ukraine appears poised to join the long list of strategic debacles – Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Yemen – each a masterclass in self-inflicted disaster”
Julian Assange might have an idea, and it doesn’t involve ‘failure’, with so much money to be made. Plandemics, Wars etc are great ways to flood economies with cash.
It is certainly true that the conjunction of financial and corporate interests can fuel unnecessary and ‘unwinnable’ wars. War can very much be racket, as Gen. Smedley Butler once said back in the 1930s. As we know, warnings of the pernicious influence of the ‘military industrial complex’ go back over nearly some decades with President Eisenhower’s farewell address. MR
They should really teach professors of strategic theory some useful basic skills. Like addition. According to
https://www.worldatlas.com/society/the-largest-standing-armies-of-the-european-union.html
the total number of soldiers of the ten largest armies of European NATO members is 1,627,000. Hence, the claim that the European armies are too feeble to stand up to Russia without the less than 500,000 soldiers the USA has in its army is obvious nonsense. But I guess addition is just militantly statist¹.
¹ Whoever invented this term has admirably conserved his total cluelessness about a few thousand years of human history outside of the USA for posterity to enjoy forever.
You have a point—maths was never my forte. That said, on paper, NATO vastly outnumbers Russia (assuming we’re still casting them as the USSR’s understudy). In theory, if Europe got serious about defence, it could stand as a credible bulwark—though getting an alliance spanning from Iceland to Turkey to move in unison is about as easy as herding caffeinated cats.
Numbers, however, mean little in a fragmented alliance that, without the US, lacks serious combat power. The British Army, for instance, might struggle to field a division, let alone muster 25 working tanks. With mismatched equipment, logistics, and doctrines, superiority on paper rarely translates to battlefield dominance.
And in the actual theatre that matters—Ukraine—Russia holds the upper hand, because that’s where the bulk of its forces are.
You speculate that whatever effort the European NATO members would make, that it wouldn’t work in the end. That’s obviously possible but until the attempt has been made, we don’t know. But that’s not due to the forces themselves being too feeble theoretically. All of these individually relatively small armies were never meant to do anything alone.
On a more practical note, the existing NATO structures are all geared towards the USA taking the leading role and any NATO efforts rely on US military intelligence, especially in the area of satellite reconnaissance. That’s just not the kind of division of labour that’s emphasized very much because Our allies are ready to put their boots on the ground but we refuse to lead them! is not the kind of story Donaldimir Putrump would like to tell to his supporters as these are supposed to feel as if it was them getting a raw deal and not the others.
Addition: I didn’t read Ludendorff’s essay and don’t plan to, at least not now. However, as opposed to Michael Rainsborough (or, for that matter, Clausewitz), Ludendorff had practical experience with waging war based an economy on war-footing which had a need to mobilize every internal force it could muster because it was cut off from all the world westward of the Baltic Sea¹.
¹ As chief of staff of the supreme commander in the East from 1914 – 1916 and chief of the German general staff until his dismissal in October 1918 because he thought the negotiated peace effort had gone seriously sour while the military situation had stabilized, something the politicians hoping to profit from a German defeat, the nice fellows from the SPD, weren’t willing to stomach. As the emperor had already surrendered his supreme command of the armed forces to a parliamentaty committee in the vain hope that this would lead Wilson (US president) to some actions towards ending the war instead of more demands for Germany to dismember itself voluntarily, this committee then essentially fired him and continued to move towards its planned destination — a German republic by grace of the western Entente powers.
^^
Deputy chief of the general staff (Generalquartiermeister), the actual chief of staff was v. Hindenburg but this was essentially a titular position for someone who had a lot of support among the German people.
It isn’t really that complicated.
Biden’s strategy to weaken Russia and restrict its future capability to invade its neighbours has been a great success; the Russian debacle in Syria an added bonus.
That strategy looks set fair to deliver Putin to the negotiating table. He needs a pause.
But Russia will go again, as many said he would in 2014.
Unilateral disarmament is a stupid strategy; always has been.
Far from weakening Russia it has made Russia much stronger with new alliances around the world.
Russia still has its ports in Syria.
Russia doesn’t need a pause, they are on the front foot.
Russia are no threat to anyone.
Broadly, I agree. Russia prepared for over 10 years to withstand Western sanctions, and as an exporter of primary source materials its economy has not been significantly affected (or at lest not as damaged as Western powers hoped). Its de facto alliance with China and other nations doesn’t indicate that Russia is especially isolated internationally.
Unilateral disarmament, I agree, is a stupid strategy, but has Russia actually been weakened? Moreover, what was the purpose of ‘Biden’s strategy to weaken Russia?’ Why do it, what’s the purpose of seeking that goal in the first place. And importantly at what cost? Thousands upon thousands of lives in order to bring ‘Putin to the negotiating table’ when he’s already in control of 20% of Ukraine? Doesn’t seem like a very good outcome to me… more like a complete debacle to add to the long list. MR
While I agree with the apparent Trump strategy, which questions why the USA would want to involve itself in a war in a country with a dubious democratic past, especially when you will need the friendship and support of the Russian ‘enemy’ in the almost certain economic and possibly military showdown with China, I do challenge the JD Vance statement about participants in a peacekeeping force. When you look at American involvement and final outcome in all post second world war conflict, they haven’t had a single successful outcome, so he can hardly sneer at those countries. Better then, surely, to have been like our European cousins and keep disdainfully out of conflict that is really none of our business and not to have squandered the blood and treasure that we have.
Interesting points for sure. One of the issues about ‘prudence’ in the construction of ‘good strategy’ is discerning which conflicts one should engage in and which ones one should keep well away from. That is, I reckon, one the points underlying J.D. Vance’s critique, not just of the the Ukraine war, but the course of US foreign policy generally since the end of the Cold War.
It is all true but we all bear responsibility. We sold our birthright for a mess of pottage and ths the ineptocracy was born. It is the insane result of a corrupted value system. It wasn’t always thus. There were some quite formidable political figures in the post-war years and many had experienced warfare themselves.
Indeed, and that generation with war experience has long departed. One consideration of the formation of ‘bad strategy’ is whether those who are all too ready to push for war in this day and age, lack any kind of what it means in reality. One notable feature is that they certainly tend to keep both themselves and their families out of harm’s way. MR
A really excellent piece.
2 observations:
Too many graduates, not enough engineers
It ain’t what you don’t know that gets you; it’s what you for certain that just ain’t so.
From one dog to another, thank you for the kind words. I concur that there are too many self-styled foreign policy/strategy ‘experts’ who credential themselves as such just by virtue of being graduates of a particular prestigious university and who then seek to glad-hand their way around the corridors of power. MR
Most people these days would claim to have always been against the second Iraq invasion. But market trends suggest otherwise. People were getting together to buy pizzas in order to watch the bombing in the same way that they watched a football match. It was all funny. Baghdad Bob and the rest. There was very little objection to David Cameron’s attack on Libya. Not to mention false flag chemical attacks in Syria. You accepted the dogma for a very long time and at great human expense.
I remember the first Iraq invasion, the staff member woke us up with the news of the bombing, all the kids cheered.
Very true for many of us… how naive we were back in those days…
A fair point, and I would include myself as someone who initially gave a pass to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 on the assumption that the UK government a) would not intentionally lie about the pretext for the invasion viz. the existence of WMD, and b) would have reasonably well-worked out plan to occupy and stabilise the country afterwards. Disabused of both these assumptions, leads one to question the whole basis of Western strategic formulation, especially when it subsequently repeats itself time and again. MR
Setting aside the conflict’s origins, battlefield realities and the merits of Trump and Vance’s diplomacy (all topics worth scrutiny), the loudest voices in media and politics seem allergic to a basic question: Why does this keep happening?
I imagine it keeps happening because UK is reluctant to admit it is no longer an imperial power. This role was partly robbed of us by USA during and after WWII, but it was partly also a tiredness on the part of the British population in assuming an everlasting superiority over other nations. We thought it was time for the other nations to enjoy independence, rather in the sense of parents realizing their children are now adults.
But this left a vacuum and I think we have not yet adjusted to a new role, which nobody has really defined. We only recently forced a definition of our nation on our politicians by demanding Brexit, i.e. a desire to become a truly independent country. But our politicians are once again ignoring our wishes.
Our first duty, in my opinion, is to avoid conflicts. Why do we believe we are superior to others? Why do we believe our democracy, our beliefs, our way of life, must be imposed on foreign countries? There are other attitudes to government, other beliefs, other ways of life that suit other countries, and which really are no concern of ours. If other people want to live differently to us then fine, why not?
Again, because of the vacuum left after the demise of the British Empire, we ended up tagging ourselves along, clutching the skirt of the new Emperor, the United States of America. This has been disastrous in leading us into all those conflicts the author has listed, and these were not our fights in the first place.
In my opinion, the solution to all these problems is to offer friendship and assistance to all other countries, to develop a healthy trade with every possible country in the world without placing demands or conditions on that trade or on that country’s government or population. In this way, we could become the useful and universally admired nation that we once used to be.
Certainly, I think that one of the attributes in returning to the ‘art’ of good strategy is to exercise prudence and that starts with the capacity to ‘know yourself’ as the ancient Chinese strategist, Sun Tzu, once said. Quite possibly it is, as you suggest, the case that significant segments of the British elite haven’t yet come to terms with the loss of great power status since World War II and therefore have a tendency to believe that they should act out on the world stage by getting involved in conflicts without thinking through the consequences. One of the basic points is not that one shouldn’t be prepared to defend one’s interests with force when necessary, but that one needs to be very careful and precise about which conflicts one chooses to get involved with. British policy makers, I would contend, possessed that capacity up to the late 1990s… but then it all went off the rails after 1997… I wonder why…? MR
I confess to being rather shocked by the long list of UK conflicts in Wikipedia (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_wars_involving_the_United_Kingdom) but I suppose that comes hand in hand with ruling an empire. I think the Falklands war was justified but after that we could have left the world to sort itself out. John Pilger, in his book The New Rulers of the World, presents very uncomfortable reading on the role of UK in Iraq, for example. Killing civilians in foreign lands is definitely not honourable and, as I wrote, there is no reason to attempt to convert Iraq into some sort of suburb of UK.
Basically I believe we should not be choosing which conflicts to get involved in at all unless they directly involve the safety of UK citizens, but rather ensure such conflicts are resolved by diplomacy. War is expensive and destructive. ‘Judge Napolitano’ and Larry Johnson are currently in Moscow and comparing the city to New York. As Johnson reported (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3GW_9IUcg-M), instead of spending their money the last 25 years on “needless foreign wars”, Russia has invested that money in building up the country. Johnson said the result is there is no rubbish in the streets, no homeless people or drug addicts living in tents, and you can walk safely at night without worrying about being mugged. UK may not be as bad as USA but you get the drift. Peace enables governments to lavish their money on issues useful to their own citizens, rather than spreading destruction and despair in foreign corners of the world.
Probably quite simple – left leaning liberal governments.
End of history liberal ideology has a lot to answer for, I agree.
At school in the 1970s, I was taught an expert was someone who knows more and more about less and less, until he knows absolutely everything about nothing.
Ironic, but so true.
The answers to your last three questions are Yes, Yes and Yes. The reason for these grotesque failures is profound and yet simple. Western academics (and others) have inappropriately over-valued abstract, analytic thinking. See ‘The Bug in our Thinking” https://www.hughwillbourn.com/book
Thank you for the book recommendation, Hugh W. I’ll be sure to get it and read with interest.
A very interesting read.
I see lots of people online supporting Ukraine, and of course our own government, but I’ve seen no one explain what exactly we are supporting i.e. what is the plan. It’s clear Ukraine isn’t going to win.
People rubbish Trump but he seems the only one with a clear aim, to end the war swiftly and peacefully.
Thank you for reading the piece, and your kind thoughts. I share your views that only a clear sighted plan to end the conflict in Ukraine is better than wishful thinking that wants to continue the war indefinitely in the hope that something might turn up. As your comment suggests, how is that realistic, let alone moral? MR
Or, how to kick the can down the road
Excellent well reasoned article. Thank you.
Thank you! I’m grateful for you taking the time to engage with the piece.
It seems to me that a university degree rather than being the opening to life long learning and an awareness of what is not known is the justification for certainty and hubris. If our present cabinet ministers and there recent predecessors are anything to go by then the PPE degree, rather than an indicator of intelligence and competence, should be a warning to all.
The police force is a prime example of the dangers of university degrees. PC plod would have known what a crime was yet now we have shoplifting given less priority than hurty words.
Well done Michael thankyou for your essay
Thank you for taking the time to read such a relatively long piece. I appreciate it. Your comment raises an intriguing and – to my mind – under researched theme, which is why supposedly educated people can come to believe in so much rubbish, and do so much damage with their ideas. Writers as varied as George Orwell and Malcolm Muggeridge regularly argued that people could be educated into stupidity. The substacker Gurwinder wrote something really good on this not so long ago: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5Peima-Uw7w – thanks again, MR